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1. Introduction 
 The slogan "Polluter pays" is here taken to mean that, in certain laws and regulations, 
polluters are required to pay damages regardless of their degree of fault for pollution.  This 
liability standard is part of two United States environmental laws.  The 1980 Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) creates a federal 
government power to respond to threats posed by toxic materials.  The 1990 Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA) creates a federal power to respond to oil spills.  CERCLA is popularly known as 
Superfund, but since the emphasis here is on the liability provisions not the trust fund, the law 
will be referred to as CERCLA.  For a history of US environmental law, written by an authority 
on CERCLA, see Lazarus (2007).   
The slogan "Polluter pays" can also be used more generally to mean that external costs of 
pollution should be internalized by polluters in some way.  These economic strategies are 
discussed in the chapter on Economic Instruments in this volume.  This chapter focuses narrowly 
on explaining the liability provisions in CERCLA and OPA. 
 An agent is at fault for wrongdoing when the agent either intentionally does wrong, or is 
reckless or negligent.  But these laws hold those who handle toxic materials and oil to the 
standard of “strict” liability, which does not require fault.  In order to explain the liability 
provisions of CERCLA and OPA, we need to address two ethical questions.  These questions are 
posed in an anthropocentric setting, since one organism's toxin is another's food or pleasant 
living environment.  First, when can an act or activity be wrong, even when the actor is not at 
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fault?  Second, when can an activity be wrong, even when it is not harmful and only poses a 
risk?  In addition, there are analogous legal questions.  Should an act or activity be held illegal, 
even when there is no intentional, reckless, or negligent wrongdoing?  Should an activity be 
illegal because it poses risks of some kind, although it is not (yet) harmful?  We also want our 
moral demands to be at least consistent with a plausible way of running society.  Although the 
latter requirement is weak, it plays a role in the following argument.   
 I shall argue that acts and activities should be held illegal for posing risks of certain 
kinds, even when the agent is not at fault, and even though there might not be any moral 
prohibition against such acts or activities.  In some cases polluters should be legally required to 
pay, and indeed they morally ought to pay, even though they may have done nothing wrong.  
This argument is deontological, and perhaps counterintuitive, so I shall address an objection 
from a consequentialist perspective that the laws framed on this basis may be irrational.   
 
2. Fault and Wrong-doing in Causally Complex Cases 
 The kind of situation we are interested in occurs in legal cases.  Here is a hypothetical 
case quoted from a standard legal reference work: 
Malloy: The Malloy Corporation produces components for computers that are essential 
to the modern economy.  Its manufacturing plant is located in a community almost all of 
which is residential.  Its manufacturing process generates a toxic chemical as a 
byproduct.  Malloy stores this chemical in storage bins pending shipment of the chemical 
to an off-site disposal facility.  This storage arrangement complies with the requirements 
of reasonable care and likewise with applicable public regulations.  Even during normal 
and proper operation, it is often necessary to open the lids on these bins for periods of 
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time.  Wind conditions may then arise that can disperse the chemical from the storage 
bins to the property of Malloy's neighbors; over time, such dispersion is quite likely but 
not certain.  When and if dispersion occurs, the toxic fumes emanating from the 
chemicals can easily induce serious illness in those living on the property. (American 
Law Institute 2010: 240)   
In this case, the Malloy Corporation is not at fault.  It exercises reasonable care.  For simplicity, 
let us stipulate, more strongly, that Malloy is exercising all reasonable care that is currently 
possible.  The Malloy Corporation's activities have not, as far as this case tells us, caused harm.  
These activities pose a serious risk of harm, however.  By the (weak) law of large numbers, a 
predictable rate of harmful results will emerge over time.    
Malloy’s activities are also probably not what the neighbors expect or understand well.  
Malloy’s chemical processes are parts of complex chains of events, including random events 
such as wind conditions, as well as the complex physiological events that would happen if 
someone were harmed.  
 The Malloy example, although it represents a common type of example, nevertheless 
goes against any intuitive belief that wrongdoing implies fault.  As long as the reader agrees that 
Malloy is doing something wrong, this example counts as evidence against the otherwise 
plausible claim that fault is necessary for wrongdoing,      
 In this case, however, it is unclear what exactly is wrong here.  Malloy is not at fault as 
long as it is exercising reasonable care and we have more strongly stipulated that it is exercising 
all possible and reasonable care.  But perhaps Malloy should not have built its factory at that 
location in the first place, and perhaps it was at fault then.  Being at fault in the distant past does 
not fit well in most legal processes, except perhaps the most monstrous crimes.  Also, the 
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surrounding community may be held equally at fault for negligence in its zoning law.  So we 
want to focus on the immediate case.   
 Why then should we disregard fault in the Malloy case?  It seems that the complexity of a 
causal chain can, in many cases, be a reason for disregarding fault. 
Day's End: When B returns home from work in the evening, he turns on the light switch 
in the front room of his apartment.  Due to circumstances B could not foresee or control, 
one night this ignites a fire in the apartment next door, which quickly kills his neighbor. 
(Thomson, 1986: 229) 
Again, it is methodologically helpful to note that this hypothetical case does not simply narrate 
my assumptions.  Instead, it provides the reader an opportunity to confirm a moral judgment.  
Another assumption that I suggest we make here, following Thomson, is that if B ought not to 
turn on the light switch, then "ought": is meant objectively, rather than describing any moral 
obligation B may have perceived or not.  Thus if Day's End were in a movie, and the audience 
had been shown the circumstances connecting the light switch to the fire, someone in the 
audience might call out, "Don't!" when B arrives home and then reaches for the light switch.  So 
I suggest that B objectively ought not to turn on the light, and in this sense is doing wrong when 
he turns on the light.   
 In the Malloy case, chemical processes constitute a paradigmatically complex causal 
chain.  The length of the causal chain could be extended further, if the chemicals were buried and 
then uncovered after many years, as in the toxic waste sites covered by CERCLA.  The complex 
processes of mining and transporting oil, covered by OPA, also count as complex causal chains.  
The long causal chains in making consumer goods have led in the US to strict liability in product 
liability (Moss 2002: 216-252).  Analogously, since most employees lack control over workplace 
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conditions, this fact has led to strict liability for worker's compensation in the US (Moss 2002: 
152-169). 
3. Risk Imposition and the Right to Self-Defense 
 Malloy has not caused any harm yet, as described in the hypothetical case.  Cases in 
which harm is clearly caused by an agent tend not to be regarded as environmental pollution 
cases.  These are cases of poisoning, asphyxiation, or burning, etc.  Environmental pollution, in 
contrast, involves risks of harm, and resulting harms are not usually clear.  Malloy, then, has 
imposed risks on its neighbors.  Is this wrong?   
 In the Malloy case, the fumes really are toxic, not merely perceived as toxic.  But in this 
case, no harm has yet occurred.  The combination of lack of harm or at least lack of proof of 
harm, together with risk of harm, is common in cases of toxic pollution.  (National Research 
Council 1991; Cranor 1993; Tesh 2000)  There is no uniform method for determining which 
risks are real, and how to compare them. (National Research Council 2007: 105-111).  There are 
statistical, toxicological, and epidemiological reasons why it is difficult to prove that even highly 
toxic materials have caused harm in people.  The exposed population is normally too small to 
allow a statistical inference using standard methods.  It is difficult to make inferences from 
animal experiments to human effects.  It is difficult to tell how much exposure a population has 
received, and by what pathways.    
In cases in which there is no proof of harm, it may also be argued that there is no real risk 
(Wildavsky 1995; Sunstein 2002).  It is difficult to know which risks are real.  But it would be a 
serious mistake to infer from this difficulty that risks are not real unless people are harmed. 
 Consider then only real risks.  Which of these risks are wrong to impose?  This is the 
ethical problem of risk imposition.  This problem is difficult to state clearly and has persistently 
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eluded an adequate solution (Lewens 2007; Hayenhjelm and Wolff 2012).  For this problem, we 
need to clarify what counts as a relevant harm or loss, as well as the situations in which 
increasing the probability of this harm or loss is wrong.  In the Malloy case there are immediate 
risks of illness for inhabitants of the neighboring property.  But beyond that there are other risks, 
such as loss of property values, inhabitants’ abilities to fulfill work and family obligations, and 
so on.  For the narrow topic in this chapter, we shall see how we can bypass the general ethical 
problem of risk imposition.     
 Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of the ethical problem of risk imposition, sometimes it 
is wrong to impose risks.  The following kind of example is often used in ethics literature for 
discussing problems of risk imposition: 
Russian roulette: B plays Russian roulette on A who does not agree to this and does not 
know about it.  (B has various revolvers, with number of cylinders ranging up to very 
large numbers, which B uses in different cases.)  In this case, there is a single bullet in B's 
six-chamber revolver, but the bullet is not under the firing the pin when B pulls the 
trigger. (Nozick 1974: 79) 
 The reader is likely to agree that B's activity is clearly wrong.  But even if it is, it is 
unclear whether B has violated A's rights.  B has not harmed A, and has not even frightened A.  It 
may be wrong to impose risks in some cases, but it is difficult to explain which risks and for 
what reason.  So instead of attempting to answer the question of which risks are wrong to 
impose, I shall argue that A has a right of self-defense.  The advantage of this approach requires 
some analysis to explain. 
 In a Hohfeldian analysis of rights, the most basic form of right is a claim-right:  A has a 
claim-right against B that B carries out action P.  Other rights are built from these units.  For 
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every claim-right that A has against B that B carries out P, there is a corresponding duty that B 
has toward A of carrying out P.  Presumably, for example, A has a right against everyone that 
none of us should poke A in the eye, and everyone has the duty not to poke A in the eye.  In 
Thomson's (1990) account of Hohfeldian rights, claims against bodily incursion are fundamental 
rights.  Many such claim-rights would have to be specified in an account of a right against risk 
impositions, and we would need to specify many acts.  
 Self-defense in a Hohfeldian analysis, however, is a privilege (Thomson 1990; Thomson 
1991; Doggett 2011).  A privilege is a lack of claims, and does not imply the existence of any 
claim.  This considerably lightens the burden of moral argument.  If A has a privilege of doing P 
with respect to B, this is analyzed:  B does not have any claim against A that A should not carry 
out action P.   
Assume that A has a right against being physically harmed.  Then in the Russian roulette 
case, there are some actions for which B has no claims that A should not carry out such actions.  
In particular B has no claim against A that A should not carry out actions of the kind that would 
prevent B from playing Russian roulette on A.  In such a case, Thomson remarks that the relevant 
thesis about self-defense is: "No one has a right that we let him infringe our rights.  No one has a 
right that we shall not prevent him from infringing on our rights."  (1986: 161)  In the Russian 
roulette case, A has a privilege of self-defense.  I suggest that Malloy’s neighbors also have a 
privilege of self-defense.  
 
4. The Right of Recourse to Government Action 
 Suppose then that by imposing risks on its neighbors, Malloy has not (yet) infringed the 
rights of any of its neighbors.  Nevertheless, the privilege of self-defense allows the residents of 
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the neighborhood to take some action.  What action?  We should worry whether the response is 
proportionate with the threat.  Again, there is a problem of evidence.  We need to worry a lot 
about what kind of evidence one needs to have about the risk in order to act (Cranor 1993).   
But again, like the questions about the extent of rights, if any, against risk imposition, we 
can bypass these difficult ethical questions here.  Perhaps the residents are entitled to vigilante 
action as soon as they learn what Malloy is doing, or perhaps not.  Instead we can assume that 
there is a government, or something like one, which is capable of acting their place.   
 This assumption about the existence of a government can be made in many ways.  We 
may assume the neighbor residents are capable of convening themselves as self-governing, and 
as a group they form a government.  Or we might assume there is some other authority for the 
neighborhood residents to call on.  We need not assume anything about the nature of the 
government, as long as the neighborhood residents end up connected with an agency of some 
sort that is capable of acting in their place.  Then the neighborhood residents' right of self-
defense does not disappear, but the residents do not act on it.  Instead, their right of self-defense 
is converted into what I call a right of recourse.  
 We do not need to analyze this right of recourse in order to understand it well enough for 
our purposes here.  There are only a few possible risk management policies that can be employed 
by a government, whatever government this may be.  There are three basic kinds of risk 
management policy: risk reduction, risk spreading, and risk shifting.  Risk management policies 
then are composed of combinations of these three basic policies (Calabresi 1970; Moss 2002).  
(It is said that the government of an industrial state is an “insurance company with an army.” To 




5. Risk Reduction 
 Risk reduction is not relevant to the Malloy case, if Malloy is already exercising all 
possible and reasonable care, as was stipulated.  But if its degree of care is merely reasonable 
and non-negligent, there may be room for improvement.  Then a negotiation, if feasible, would 
attempt to find an agreement on whether the neighborhood residents should pay Malloy for an 
increased level of safety, or whether Malloy should compensate the residents for the risk they are 
running.   
Bribing Malloy: If Malloy installs vapor-capturing mechanisms on its chemical storage 
bins, the problem of toxic fumes will be eliminated.  Suppose the vapor-capture 
mechanism costs less than the costs of illnesses caused by Malloy's toxic fumes.  Then it 
is efficient for the neighborhood residents to pay Malloy's cost of installing the vapor-
capturing mechanisms.  None of the neighborhood residents complain.  Every 
neighborhood resident willingly contributes to the bribery fund. 
If such negotiations fail, and if Malloy avoids the costs, then action by some other authority, 
acting as a government, would be required for an efficient outcome.  This authority would 
compel Malloy to install the vapor-capturing mechanisms.  It might impose the cost on Malloy or 
else collect it from the neighborhood residents.  Either way, the agreement would reduce risks.  
Also, both choices are equally efficient.  That is, no further rearrangement of goods would 
improve things for either Malloy or the residents, without also being to someone's detriment.  
The classic economic analysis of this situation is by Coase (1960). 
 The reader will probably agree that it is unlikely that the neighborhood residents and 
Malloy would be able to come to an agreement to reduce the risk due to the toxic fumes, without 
having to appeal to another authority capable of compelling Malloy to install vapor-capture 
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mechanisms.  Instead it is likely that obstacles of various kinds will intervene, including lack of 
knowledge, delays, suspicion, uncooperativeness, and the expense of lawyers and courts.  These 
are collectively labeled "transaction costs" by economists and economics-minded lawyers 
(Calabresi 1970).  But suppose that by an agreement or by compulsion, an authority is successful 
in reducing risks.  Then success in this sense is measured by an outcome, installing vapor-
capturing mechanisms.  Possibly, there could also be measurable health benefits.  But that is not 
assumed here.  
 
6. Risk Spreading 
 Risk spreading is done by insurance or else something that functions like insurance.  
Given a probability p of incurring a cost C each year, and given a group of people with the same 
probability and potential cost, everyone in the group pays pC, plus administrative overhead, each 
year to an administrator, who pays C to each member when she incurs the cost.  The 
mathematics of the weak law of large numbers implies the existence of a predictable annual cost 
for a group of individuals with similar risks.  
Spreading risks of non-compensable harms, such as illness or injury, would amount to a 
threat of a harm to everyone in a group.  Such threats may be common, but they violate due 
process rights.  So risk spreading spreads costs.    
 Spreading risks is often rational even if individuals are not risk adverse.  Suppose that a 
hypothetical illness strikes by chance on average once every four years.  Then there is only 1/16 
chance (0.0625) of getting it in two years in a row.  But over three years, there is a bit less than 
1/5 chance (0.1875) of getting it two years in a row, this chance rises to over 1/5 (0.2109) over 
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four years, and it keeps rising.  For individuals who are not risk adverse, insurance is a rational 
way of avoiding the excess savings needed to cover short runs of “bad luck.” 
Insuring Against Malloy: Malloy’s neighbors agree to spread the risk of exposure to 
toxic fumes.  Exposure depends on wind direction when Malloy opens the bins of toxic 
material.  Not all the neighbors are exposed at once.  The neighborhood forms a mutual 
insurance organization, spreading risk among themselves.  
If every neighborhood resident buys insurance, this spreads the risk.  If a toxic emission occurs, 
then the affected residents will be awarded a payment.  Again, the reader will probably agree 
that, even if this policy were acceptable and rational, it is unlikely that every neighborhood 
resident will enter such an agreement, without some push from other residents or the 
government.     
 
7. Risk Shifting 
 Neither the policies of risk reduction nor those of risk spreading provide everything that 
one would want from risk management.  Risk reduction is an important goal.  But achieving it is 
indifferent to whom bears the cost, and the cost may be borne by neighborhood residents.  Risk 
spreading pays victims after the fact.  But potential victims bear the cost of risk spreading.  
Neither of these policies is a substitute for the residents' privilege of self-defense, which gives 
them the right to act prior to being harmed in order to prevent their being harmed.     
 Risk shifting is the only other policy that a government can provide.  It is not generally 
accepted that Malloy’s owners should be exposed to the risks of exposure to toxic fumes in place 
of the neighborhood residents.  So shifting risk means shifting costs.  The usual rationale is 
efficiency.  Malloy is better able to anticipate risks and has more control over them than the 
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neighborhood residents.  So Malloy should bear the risks.  To the extent the risks are managed 
by insuring or investing in safer technology, the risk becomes a cost of doing business.  Fault 
may be irrelevant if risk shifting merely allocates this cost either on the neighbors or on Malloy.  
Another reason for disregarding fault is the complexity of the causal chain leading to harm.  Yet 
another reason is that the burden of proving Malloy is at fault may be too difficult for 
neighborhood residents, even if Malloy in fact is at fault.     
Risk shifting, finally, is a plausible substitute for neighborhood residents' right of self-
defense.  Risk shifting gives the residents something, at least, in exchange for giving up their 
right of self-defense.  In exchange, Malloy is made to give up one of its defenses.  Malloy is 
made to give up the defense that it was not at fault.  Without that recourse, residents’ options are 
limited.  They can just put up with the risks, bribe the risk imposer, move away, or undertake 
vigilante action.  Gibbs (1998) and Bullard (2000) give influential primary accounts of citizen 
action in this situation.  Szasz (1994) analyzes the political context of these events. 
Risk shifting assures residents they will not pay the costs of Malloy's risk imposition.  
Risk shifting can be an efficient means for inducing risk reduction.  Malloy is in a better position 
to reduce risks than the neighborhood residents.  But if Malloy is able to spread its risk of 
compensation for harm to residents by buying liability insurance, this lowers its incentive to 
reduce risks.   
 
8. Strict Liability in Environmental Law 
 Now we can explain the liability provisions of CERCLA and OPA.  Both these laws 
entitle the government to act in response to threats.  In CERCLA, government recourse is 
provided for toxic threats to people.  In OPA, government recourse is provided for threats to 
13 
 
natural resources.  In CERCLA and OPA, risk shifting is combined with risk reduction.  In these 
laws, liability shifts risk, and risk is reduced when the federal or state government orders a liable 
party to clean up a hazard it has caused.  Risk shifting is explained by the need for self-defense, 
which in practice emerges in a demand for government recourse.     
Risk shifting need not be efficient, although efficiency is one argument in favor of 
shifting risks with complex causes onto those who cause the risks, and presumably are better able 
to control them.  But the goal of risk reduction does not explain the risk shifting provisions in 
CERCLA and OPA.  Indeed, Congress abandoned one important risk shifting provision of 
CECLA in 1995 by failing to reauthorize a tax on the chemical and oil industries, which allows 
some of the risks of these industries to shift back onto the taxpaying public, where they have 
since remained.  A policy of risk reduction alone does not require polluters to pay.  But the 
liability provisions of CERCLA remain in effect.   
 Liability in CERCLA is for releases or threatened releases of hazardous materials.  
Liability is strict, joint and several, and retrospective.  Strict liability, as has been explained, is 
liability that applies regardless of any degree of fault.  Liability that is "joint and several" means 
that every person that contributes to a hazard can be found liable for the whole problem.  Then 
presumably secondary suits will sort out the degree of liability after an initial civil action by the 
United States or a State.  The purposes of this harsh "joint and several" liability are to obtain 
efficient recovery of costs and to force action. 
 The terms, "strict," "joint and several," and "retrospective" do not occur in the text of 
CERCLA or OPA.  Instead, the laws set out liability in the form of lists of those covered, and the 
defenses they are entitled to.  The text of CERCLA (42 USC §9607(a)) gives an expansive list of 
persons covered by the law, including any “owner” or “operator” of any entity in charge of 
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hazardous materials.  The text of CERCLA, at the same place, gives a very narrow range of 
defenses, none of which depends on degree of fault.  The defenses are based on (1) “an act of 
God,” (2) “an act of war,” (3) “an act or omission of a third party.”  That is, the only defense is 
that someone or something other than the defendant caused the problem.  The definition of 
liability in the 1980 CERCLA is nearly the same as 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act 
covering oil spills, which later was incorporated in the 1972 Clean Water Act (33 USC §1321), 
to which the 1990 OPA liability rules (33 USC §2703) made no changes (Murchison 2011).          
 Retrospective liability may seem unfair.  But, like strict liability, it makes sense for 
assigning liability in complex causal chains.  For example, at the Love Canal toxic waste site that 
initially prompted the 1980 CERCLA law, the current owner of the site was the Niagara Falls 
School Board, which had built an elementary school on top of a thinly covered toxic waste site in 
the middle of a residential neighborhood.  The purchase of the site from the Hooker Corporation 
(later part of Occidental Chemical), proves, if anything, that the School Board was not capable of 
understanding and managing the risks, not that it should be held responsible.  In this case, 
remedial action need not depend on who, if anyone, is at fault, whether the School Board or 
Hooker (U.S. vs. Hooker 1994).  Hooker (Occidental) was required to pay for a cleanup simply 
because it caused the hazard.  In order to achieve this outcome at Love Canal, the neighborhood 
residents sought the protection of the State and federal governments and did not try to negotiate 
with Hooker or get compensation from the company or School Board (Gibbs 1998).  This 
strategy is explained by the model of self-defense and government recourse.   
 
9. Consequences of Strict Liability 
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 The consequences of CERCLA and OPA are not guaranteed to be efficient.  The success 
of CERCLA might be measured by its effectiveness in cleaning up the sites on the National 
Priorities List of sites requiring Environmental Protection Agency attention.  As of May, 2020, 
there were 1335 sites on the NPL, and 424 had been deleted from the NPL as not needing further 
EPA work.  At 1215 sites, remedial construction had been completed, after which sites 
sometimes remain on the NPL and sometimes are deleted (EPA 2020).   
 The NPL and the costs of CERCLA are a good way to measure the success of CERCLA.  
Also there are sites that are currently unknown but will be put on the NPL in the future, as well 
as sites that actually need cleanups but will remain unknown.  There is a continuing threat due to 
toxic chemical waste against which self-defense and government recourse are needed, even if 
every site currently on NPL is eventually cleaned up so well as to be deleted from the list.  
 Success is more difficult to measure for OPA, since oil spills are infrequent.  The 2010 
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion offers an unwelcome opportunity to check on the 
outcomes of OPA.  Environmental, social, and legal consequences of the massive spill that 
followed the 2010 explosion persist 10 years afterwards.  The explosion initially killed 11 
drilling rig workers, resulting in a criminal manslaughter conviction for BP.  In September 2014, 
BP was found to have been grossly negligent, which removed limits on BP’s civil liability.  On 
October 5, 2015, a $5.5 billion OPA civil penalty was imposed by a US federal judge, together 
with $15.3 billion damages. (EPA 2015; US Department of Justice 2016)            
 
10. Risk Shifting in Context  
 Risk shifting is unavoidably disruptive to polluters.  In the hypothetical case, Malloy 
might not be able to afford the vapor-capturing mechanisms we have imagined would reduce 
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risks of exposure to toxic fumes.  Then Malloy would either have to go out of business, or else 
sell its business to a larger company.  Political conflict is inevitable, since polluters will seek to 
avoid such outcomes. This kind of political conflict explains the OPA liability limit.  OPA limits 
liability for offshore releases to removal costs plus $75 million (33 US §2704) to cover other 
damages, including economic damages.   
This penalty seems far too low in comparison with the cost of the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.  In addition to OPA liability and damages imposed in 2015, BP created a $20 
billion fund for settling economic damage claims, among other costs stemming from the spill.  
The low liability limit protects smaller oil drillers who are politically powerful in oil producing 
states.  Shifting risks onto these drillers would be disruptive to them, although it seems likely that 
drillers can efficiently reduce risks.  Aldy (2011) and Murchison (2011) discuss risk spreading 
by drillers.      
 The disruptive character of risk shifting may make it unattractive to anyone who hopes 
for a decision procedure that avoids political conflict and which instead aims directly and 
consciously toward efficient decisions (Sunstein 2002).  Risk assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis, in particular, are ways of planning for efficient outcomes.  A consequentialist objection 
to the deontology of rights and self-defense is that self-defense and government recourse, in 
comparison, seems haphazard and irrational, and may lead to worse outcomes than good 
planning.  A response to the objection can, I think, be framed more directly and 
straightforwardly, when based on the account of self-defense and government recourse used in 
this chapter, than when given in terms of rights, understood more generally or in a more 
idealized way.   
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The response is that self-defense and formation of social authorities for carrying it out is 
a basic feature of human life.  At the beginning of this chapter, I said that the setting was 
anthropocentric.  Other kinds of organisms might not be driven in the same way to defend 
themselves, and do not form societies in the same ways.  This response to the irrationality 
objection is more naturalistic than a response based on more idealized moral theories would be.  
It should be emphasized that the self-defense justification for government action is limited to 
cases, such as Molloy, in which citizens’ self-defense would be justified.  
The argument here has shown how the choice of strict liability policies for managing 
risks of toxic pollution and oil spills is nearly forced on us.  A basic right to self-defense, in a 
context of government management of risks of industrial activity, drives this choice of policy, 
even if some lingering ethical questions about fault and risk imposition remain unresolved.  The 
reason for strict liability policies does not depend on how we resolve such lingering questions.   
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